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Most of its sunset actions have been
based on analyses by the now de-
funct CWPS, which did excellent
work but often did not have suffi-
cient political authority to halt the
undesirable policies. As the OMB
group gets past the recent batch of
regulations, it should begin to delve
much more deeply into the huge
body of older regulations, which
will mean doing ex post evaluations
in order to learn which rules have
been effective and which have not.
This will require a substantial ex-
pansion in OMB's policy analysis
capability.
In some of the sunset actions
taken so far, Congress or the agency
itself has taken the initiative. It was
Congress, for example, that forced
the CPSC to relax its lawn mower
standard a bit. For the most part,
however, OMB has led the way, with
the agencies cooperating more than
they used to but still much less than
a regulatory reformer would like.
Agency Performance and Policies.
Let me now turn briefly to the risk
regulation agencies. First, the agen-
cy I know best, OSHA. Under its
new leadership, there has been a
most welcome decrease in the agen-
cy's antagonism toward the business
community, and there has been,
largely at OMB's urging, greater em-
phasis on regulatory analysis. But
OSHA Administrator Thorne Auch-
ter's biggest change has been to ex-
empt low-risk firms from inspec-
tions. While well-intended, this is
the wrong approach. A scheme for
targeting inspections is desirable
and long overdue, but accident sta-
tistics are not, by themselves, a
sufficient guide to where we want to
enforce health and safety stand-
ards. OSHA should be emphasizing
health, not safety, and accident sta-
tistics primarily reflect safety. In
addition, rather than simply focus-
ing on the overall accident rate,
OSHA should start worrying about
the compliance costs it is imposing.
Technological efficiency matters,
and an efficient industrial technol-
ogy may be high risk rather than
low risk.
It is interesting to note that,
even with OMB largely determining
the agenda for changes in OSHA
standards, we do not yet see any
new approaches to job risk regula-
tion. Instead, the agency has been
weeding out some of its most ill-
conceived individual regulations.
But those are not always the most
damaging ones. For example, the
diving standard is a bad regulation
by almost any criterion, but it's not
very consequential in the total
scheme of things. The lead standard
is a good target for sunset review,
but that task is not nearly as im-
portant as revamping all of the
agency's safety standards. And the
agency's decision to review its car-
cinogen policy was a better idea be-
fore the cotton-dust decision than
after it. Nevertheless, especially
since the potential cost of this poli-
cy is in the hundreds of billions, I
still think it's important to lay out
policy criteria in this area. These
should include information as an
alternative to regulation.
Perhaps one reason why we
don't yet have major innovations
from OSHA is that they are still bot-
tled up within the new regulatory
oversight process. For example,
the chemical labeling regulations,
which OMB is now considering,
could be the best OSHA policy ever.
Chemical labeling focuses on health
and not safety, and it works
through the market by providing in-
formation. For this approach to be
useful, however, it should utilize an
easily understood hazard-warning
system (like that now employed by
the paint industry) rather than for-
midable listings of chemical com-
pounds (as proposed by OSHA in
January 1981). Moreover, OSHA
should couple any chemical label-
ing policy to a commitment to for-
swear the substance-by-substance
regulation it has pursued in the
past. The decision it makes on
chemical labeling will signal the de-
gree to which the agency is charting
a new course instead of simply tin-
kering with its arsenal of existing
regulations.
The National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA)
has also been relatively active. Most
recently it rolled back its passive
restraint standard. The question I
have as an outsider is, why did it do
this? An analysis by economist Wil-
liam Nordhaus of Yale showed that
the benefits of air bags would ex-
ceed the costs. Does NHTSA have
some other analysis that showed the
opposite? By justifying its decision
on the grounds that previous stud-
ies had reached conflicting conclu-
sions, NHTSA opened itself to the
charge that it is more interested in
helping the auto industry than in
trying to select policies on their
merits where the evidence is un-
clear, as the evidence usually is. At
the least, what we have here is an
instance of failing to articulate
clearly the economic rationale be-
hind its policies.
NHTSA has been much less ven-
turesome when it comes to shifting
its overall regulatory approach: it
still refuses to calculate the cost per
life of any of its regulations. Unlike
OSHA, it has not yet placed its regu-
latory analyses on a sound basis by
insisting, at the very minimum, that
cost-effectiveness tests be per-
formed.
On the brighter side, NHTSA is
reconsidering its standard to make
bumpers withstand a five-mile-per-
hour impact. I should emphasize
that this standard has no safety ef-
fect whatsoever and is intended only
to save consumers money. Yet, its
costs so clearly exceed its benefits
that it is hard to justify from a con-
sumer welfare standpoint. More fun-
damentally, NHTSA has never pro-
vided any evidence that the market
doesn't work in this area. And final-
ly, in a classic case of bureaucratic
confusion, even as NHTSA has been
pursuing more durable bumpers it
has also been thinking about mak-
ing bumpers softer so that they
won't injure pedestrians. Clearly
NHTSA ought to forget about bump-
ers altogether.
Moving on to the Consumer
Product Safety Commission (CPSC),
I find it a unique case among the
health and safety agencies. Its budg-
et has been cut the most, about in
half over the last few years. And
unlike the other agencies, it is
locked in not by its legislation, but
by its leadership-its five commis-
sioners. The CPSC could, but does
not, stop using its Section 15 author-
ity under the Consumer Product
Safety Act, which gives it carte
blanche to ban or recall any prod-
uct at will (without issuing regula-
REGULATION, JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1982 35
HEALTH AND SAFETY
"THANKS, PAL-AO IS TAHRE AWY WAY YOU CAN
KEEP THOSE TRICKY JAPANESE AUTO MAKERS
FROM INSTALLIN6 THEM IN TEIR CARS?'
(@ 1981 by Herblock in the Washington Post.
tions to guide businessmen). It
could, but does not, abandon its
reliance on risk as the paramount
policy concern in favor of recogniz-
ing the important trade-offs that
need to be made. Moreover, it has
a positive mandate, stated clearly
in the act, to pursue informational
strategies as an alternative to com-
mand-and-control regulations. But
it has largely ignored this mandate.
To repeat, the only real constraints
on the CPSC are its commissioners.
As yet, none of them has shown any
vision on how the agency's policies
should be redirected.
At the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission and the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA), policy reform
has moved slowly, pretty much as in
the past. The FDA seems to be
speeding up the approval time for
new drugs, but its overall emphasis
on risk reduction rather than bene-
fit-cost balancing has remained in-
tact.
Let me briefly turn to the policy
changes I'd like to see. First the
CPSC should be reorganized into
an executive branch agency (per-
haps within the Department of
Commerce), led by a single admin-
istrator. This would be much more
effective than the present chaotic
rule by committee. In addition, if
any agency needs close regulatory
oversight, this one is it. The reorga-
nized agency should base its regu-
lations on a benefit-cost test and
rely on informational alternatives
to standards.
For the rest of the risk regula-
tion agencies, we need two things.
First, as for statutory changes, there
are problems not only with the
Clean Air Act, but also with the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Act,
the Delaney amendment, and so on.
These problems are related, and
dealing with them requires a clearly
articulated policy statement from
the White House. In particular, the
administration should call for the
abandonment of risk-based regula-
tion.
Second, it is not sufficient for
these agencies simply to exhibit less
antibusiness bias, do less, and end
up with fewer regulations on the
books. We need to bring about a
basic shift in approach-one that
limits interventions to situations of
market inadequacy, that empha-
sizes working with rather than
against market forces (for example,
providing information instead of
imposing rigid standards), and that
experiments with innovative strate-
gies. In the case of OSHA, we should
focus on health hazards rather-than
safety hazards. For auto safety, we
should calculate the cost-effective-
ness of all of NHTSA's and the
Transportation Department's poli-
cies on safety-from roads to cars
to guard rails-and try to reallocate
resources across these areas effi-
ciently.
Getting such a new long-term
direction for regulatory policy is
perhaps most important of all. At
present, many of these administra-
tors seem so unclear about where
they ultimately want to take their
agencies that one wonders if they
even know themselves.
WITH RESPECT TO an overall report
card, NHTSA and OSHA merit fair
marks on an absolute scale, which
is an improvement over past years;
NRC and the FDA should get pretty
much the same grade as before;
and the CPSC continues to fail,
maybe even more completely than
in the past. a
36 AEI JOURNAL ON GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY
